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Abstract
In an abstract framework, we examine how a tradeoff between efficiency and risk
arises in different dynamic oligopolistic markets. We consider a scenario where there
is a reliable resource provider and agents which enter and exit the market following
a random process. Self-interested and fully rational agents can both produce and
consume the resource. They dynamically update their load scheduling decisions
over a finite time horizon, under the constraint that the net resource consumption
requirements are met before each individual’s deadline.
We first examine the system performance under the non-cooperative and coop-
erative market architectures, both under marginal production cost pricing of the
resource. The statistics of the stationary aggregate demand processes induced by
the two market architectures show that although the non-cooperative load schedul-
ing scheme leads to an efficiency loss - widely known as the “price of anarchy” -
the stationary distribution of the corresponding aggregate demand process has a
smaller tail. This tail, which corresponds to rare and undesirable demand spikes, is
important in many applications of interest.
With a better understanding of the efficiency-risk tradeoff, we investigate, in a
non-cooperative setup, how resource pricing can be used as a tool by the system
operator to tradeoff between efficiency and risk.
We further provide a convex characterization of the Pareto front of different
system performance measures. The Pareto front determines the tradeoff among
volatility suppression of concerned measurements in the system with load scheduling
dynamics. This is the fundamental tradeoff in the sense that system performance
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achieved by any load scheduling strategies induced by any specific market architec-
tures is bounded by this Pareto front.
Thesis Supervisor: Munther A. Dahleh
Title: Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Load scheduling, i.e., optimizing the demand for a resource over multiple periods to
minimize the expected total cost of consumption, plays a crucial role in a wide array
of applications, including dynamic demand response to realtime prices in electricity
markets [6, 22], load scheduling in cloud computing under QoS constraints [4, 17,
3], and multi-period rebalancing of multiple portfolio accounts in the presence of
transaction costs [25]. In many cases where the price per unit resource in each period
is determined by the instantaneous aggregate demand of finitely many agents, the
problem falls into the category of dynamic oligopolistic competition [18, 16].
In a multi-agent system, profit-seeking agents try to maximize their own utilities,
by forming rational expectations over the behaviors of other agents, and responding
to instantaneous changes in the environment. The agent load scheduling scheme at
equilibrium is shaped by different features of the oligopolistic market architecture,
including whether the agents are able to cooperate in decision making, including
the risk sensitivity of the agents, and including how their costs are coupled, namely,
the rule that the price is determined. From a system operator’s perspective, the
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impact of the aggregate behavior of rational agents is nontrivial – on one hand, it
determines the system efficiency, and on the other hand, agent interactions can lead
to endogenous risk. For example, in electricity markets, aggregate demand spikes
can incur additional costs to the resource provider or the power system as a whole.
We shall focus on the measure of risk that quantifies such aggregate demand spikes,
and examine how they may arise from the market architectural properties.
In many complex systems with interactive agents, for example, power networks,
financial markets, social networks, and biological networks, the mechanisms that can
possibly channel exogenous shocks into endogenous risk are still not well understood.
Previous research efforts have explored various possible origins of endogenous risk.
The notion of “endogenous risk” in financial market was introduced in [8, 9]. When
homogeneous traders with trading limits start to sell as the price decreases, their
failure to endogenize other traders’ actions leads to price fluctuation and instability.
The authors argue that ignoring the feedback link from traders’ actions to the mar-
ket price can damage the financial market in this way. Other research efforts that
attempted to explain the fluctuations in financial market have examined information
asymmetry [5], bounded rationality [21] and heterogeneous beliefs [11]. In our work,
we assume rational agents, who are fully aware of the pricing mechanism, have com-
plete information about other agents in the market, and form rational expectations.
In this work, we provide an alternative explanation through a comparative study,
and posit that endogenous risks can arise from the nature of the system dynamics
even at a complete information rational expectation equilibrium (REE).
We create an abstract dynamic framework to model agents’ response to realtime
costs in the form of load scheduling with deadline constraints, and we investigate the
impact of aggregate behavior on system performance, with the hope of finding be-
haviors and properties that transcend the abstraction of the model. We first examine
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the system performance under the non-cooperative and cooperative market architec-
tures, both with marginal production cost pricing of the resource so that agents’
demands for the resource are strategic substitutes. Under the non-cooperative mar-
ket architecture, the load scheduling problem is formulated as a stochastic dynamic
oligopolistic game, and under the cooperative market architecture, it is formulated
as an infinite-horizon average-cost Markov decision problem (MDP). We shall focus
on two performance measures: market efficiency and the risk of aggregate demand
spikes. In the non-cooperative market, each agent schedules his consumption to op-
timize his expected cost of implementing his schedule; in the cooperative market,
the agents cooperate in the decision making process to optimize aggregate expected
cost. We observe that under the cooperative market architecture, the agents are
more aggressive in absorbing exogenous uncertainties, and they can achieve higher
market efficiency, i.e., lower cost on average. However, the tradeoff is a higher en-
dogenous risk in terms of a higher probability of aggregate demand spikes. We also
show that across load scheduling strategies induced by various oligopolistic market
architectures, there exists a tradeoff between efficiency and risk.
With a better understanding of the origin of the aggregate demand spikes, we
facilitate the analysis by focusing on the linear time-invariant part of the system
dynamics and defining the substitute performance measures. In the linear time-
invariant framework, we examine how the pricing rule can be used to induce the
desired agent behavior in a non-cooperative market. Moreover, we characterize the
Pareto front of system performance measures, which describes the fundamental trade-
off limit for the system with the load scheduling dynamics. The implication of our
efficiency and risk analysis is that when the system architecture and operational
policies are designed, system efficiency should not be the only goal that is pursued;
endogenous risk and the associated tradeoffs should also be carefully considered.
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An interesting example where we can apply the analytical framework to study
the efficiency-risk tradeoffs is the dynamic demand response to realtime prices in
electricity markets in the form of scheduling flexible loads. On the supply side, the
intermittency of the renewable sources introduces exogenous supply shocks. On the
demand side, large or perhaps small consumers may be able to actively respond to
the realtime eletricity prices. A considerable amount of the consumer response will
take the form of scheduling flexible loads, for example, electrical vehicle charging,
building heating, and industrial processing [1, 15, 20]. A specific example of electri-
cal vehicle charging where our framework fits can be found in [10]. We model the
market participation behavior of both the consumers and the distributed renewable
generations, with potential load scheduling and storage techniques. The resulting
dynamic demand supply interaction can better model future smart grids. Consumer
participation in smart grids is modeled in a similar way in [7], but the heterogeneous
deadline constraints of individual players, which are essential in producing the ag-
gregate demand spikes in our framework, are not modeled explicitly there. However,
this is important, as in electricity markets, exceedingly large demand and/or price
spikes introduce a level of volatility that can not only cause serious economic damage
to both the reliable service provider and consumers, but also undermine viability of
power markets as a whole.
The remainder of the thesis unfolds as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce the
system model and formulate the problem; in Chapter 3, we focus on a specific case
for which analytical solutions are obtained, and examine how various architectural
properties affect the efficiency-risk tradeoffs; in Chapter 4, we introduce the linear
time-invariant framework, and discuss how the system operator’s decision on the
pricing rule will affect agent load scheduling behavior in a non-cooperative setup; in
Chapter 5, we provide a convex characterization of the Pareto front of performance
18
measures, which dictates the fundamental tradeoff of the system with load scheduling
dynamics; in Chapter 6, we conclude the paper with a discussion about future work.
19
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Chapter 2
System Model
In this chapter we introduce the general system model consisting of heterogeneous
agents which arrive at the system following a random arrival process, a reliable
resource provider and a marginal cost pricing mechanism. We also define the non-
cooperative and cooperative market architectures.
2.1. Agent Arrival Process
We analyze a market model in which the agent arrival process is a discrete time
random process with time intervals indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . When an agent
arrives, he activates a job that requires consuming a certain amount of the resource
to complete. The agent has to finish the job within a finite window of time, and
leave the market at his deadline. We define the number of periods that an agent
stays in the market to be his type, denoted by l ∈ L = {1, . . . , L}. We assume that
agents of type l arrive according to a Bernoulli process {hl(t) : t ∈ Z}, with rate ql.
Upon arrival at the beginning of period t, an agent carries a job which requires dl(t)
21
units of the resource in total. We assume that the sequence {dl(t) : t ∈ Z} is i.i.d.,
drawn from a general distribution Dl with mean µl = E[Dl], variance σ
2
l = Var[Dl],
and with support over the set of all real numbers R. Let the L-dimensional column
vectors h(t) = [hl(t)] ∈ {0, 1}L, and d(t) = [dl(t)] ∈ RL denote the vector forms of
arrival events and the corresponding workloads. Let U(t) denote the instantaneous
aggregate demand for the resource from all agents in the market. The key notations
that we will introduce throughout the paper are listed in Table A.1.
Remark 1 Note that for the convenience of our analysis, we allow the load real-
izations as well as the instantaneous resource demand from the agents to become
negative. This models the situation where distributed agents can be both suppliers
and consumers in the market. In financial market, the informed traders can be both
buyers and sellers, and the uninformed traders have a passive role which is simi-
lar to the reliable resource provider [13]. In electricity markets, this corresponds to
the scenario where consumers are equipped with distributed renewable generations or
pumped-storage units, and are able to sell energy back to the power grid. We ran
extensive numerical simulations for the scenario where there is a lower bound on
instantaneous resource demand and/or supply. In particular, when the lower bound
equals zero, the agents are only consumers and cannot supply the resource to the
market. In all of our the simulations, the main results hold qualitatively.
2.2. Resource pricing
We assume that there is a reliable resource provider which always produces enough
amount of the resource to meet the aggregate demand in each period. Moreover, we
assume that the production cost borne by the provider is of quadratic form 1
2
U(t)2,
22
and the price per unit resource, p(t), is set to be the marginal cost of production in
each period, thus p(t) = U(t). We adopt quadratic cost functions for two reasons:
firstly they constitute second-order approximation to other types of nonlinear cost
functions, and secondly they are analytically tractable, with which closed-form solu-
tions can hopefully provide insights into more general system dynamics. Also, note
that the quadratic cost function only models the production cost of the reliable re-
source provider, which we assume to have no intertemporal constraints. Overall, the
aggregate demand is satisfied by the sum of distributed supplies from the agents, and
the resource produced by the reliable resource provider. The price is set to provide
sufficient incentive to the reliable resource provider to produce at the level where
the overall production matches the aggregate consumption. In electricity markets,
marginal cost pricing is a widely used mechanism [23]. When both the suppliers and
consumers are price takers and there is no intertemporal ramping cost, marginal cost
leads to social optimality. Moreover, the reliable resource provider corresponds to
the conventional electricity generations which provide reliable electricity, as opposed
to the distributed renewable generations, which are stochastic in the nature.
2.3. System State Evolution
At any period t, we group the agents by their departure times. For any τ ∈ L, there
are at most (L+ 1 − τ) agents who will stay in the market for τ periods (including
t). They correpond to the type τ arrival at time t, the type (τ + 1) arrival at time
(t−1), etc. Take L = 5, τ = 3 as an example. Figure B-1 shows that at time t there
are 3 possible agents who will stay in the market for τ = 3 periods. For notational
convenience, we index a type l agent who at time t will continue to stay in the market
23
for τ periods by a tuple (l, τ)t, and we list all possible (l, τ) tuple in the ordered set:
C = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1) · · · ,(L, 1),
(2, 2), (3, 2), · · · ,(L, 2),
· · · ,(L, L).}
Let Dc = L(L + 1)/2 denote the cardinality of the ordered set C. Let u(l,τ)(t) ∈ R
denote the instantaneous demand from agent (l, τ)t, with the vector form denoted
by:
u(t) = [u(l,τ)(t) : (l, τ) ∈ C] ∈ RDc .
If at time t there is no agent (l, τ)t, i.e., hl(t+τ−l) = 0, we simply define u(l,τ)(t) = 0.
The instantaneous aggregate demand is therefore U(t) =
∑
(l,τ)∈C u(l,τ)(t) = 1
′u(t),
where 1 is a Dc-dimensional column vector of all ones. Similarly, we define the
backlog state x(t) and the existence state o(t) as follows:
x(t) = [x(l,τ)(t) : (l, τ) ∈ C] ∈ RDc , (2.1)
o(t) = [o(l,τ)(t) : (l, τ) ∈ C] ∈ {0, 1}Dc, (2.2)
where element x(l,τ)(t) denotes agent (l, τ)t’s unsatisfied load at time t, and element
o(l,τ)(t) = 1 if and only if there is an arrival of type l agent at time (t + τ − l).
Finally, system state at time t is defined to be s(t) = (x(t), o(t)) ∈ S, where S =
R
Dc × {0, 1}Dc is the state space. We assume that system state is updated after
the realization of h(t) and d(t) at the beginning of each period t, and the state
information is publicly available to all agents in the market1. The system state
1 We acknowledge that this complete information assumption is very strong in real life applica-
tions with autonomous agents, especially when the number of agents is large. Information structure,
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s(t) = (x(t), z(t)) evolves as follows:
x(t + 1) = R1(x(t)− u(t)) +R2d(t) (2.3)
o(t + 1) = R1o(t) +R2h(t) (2.4)
where R1 is a Dc ×Dc matrix with non-zero elements:
R1
(
(k − 1)(L+ 2− k
2
) + i+ 1, k(L+
1− k
2
) + i
)
= 1,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ L− k and 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1,
and all other elements being 0. Also, R2 is a Dc×L matrix with non-zero elements:
R2
(
(l − 1)(L+ 2− l
2
) + 1, l
)
= 1, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L.
and all other elements being 0. As an example, the matrices R1 and R2 for L = 3
are given in Appendix D.4.
2.4. Non-cooperative Market Architecture
We define the non-cooperative market architecture to be a market setup in which
there is no coordination among the strategic agents in scheduling their loads. With
full information about the system model and the state evolution {s(t′) : t′ ≤ t}, an
agent (l, τ)t makes the decision of his instantaneous resource demand u(l,τ)(t) based
on his observation of system state s(t). We assume that the agents do not directly
though an important issue in dynamic games, is not the focus of this paper, as the identified mech-
anism that produces endogenous risk of spikes also exists in incomplete information models. This
simplification assumption affords us a model which is tractable and can serve as a benchmark for
incomplete information models.
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derive utility from consumption of the resource. Thus the only objective they have is
to minimize the expected total cost, under the constraint that each agent’s total con-
sumption by his deadline must be equal to his workload. Note that compared to the
standard modeling of utility as an increasing function in consumption, this is a more
accurate modeling of consumer behavior in terms of decision making about electric-
ity consumption. Our framework can also be extended to cases where agents value
their consumptions. For example, later in Chapter 5, we shall relax the deadline con-
straints, while including the disutility from the mismatch between real consumptions
and the target consumption to complete the tasks into agent payoff function.
More specifically, under the non-cooperative architecture, a type l agent who
arrives at time t dynamically optimizes his consumption schedule {u(l,l−i)(t+ i) : i =
0, 1, . . . , l − 1} to minimize his expected payment E[∑l−1i=0 p(t+ i)u(l,l−i)(t+ i)]. Due
to the cost coupling through endogenous pricing, we model agent interaction by a
stochastic dynamic game, with the following specificiation:
• Players: Over infinite time horizon, the players are indexed by {(l, τ)t : t ∈
Z, (l, τ) ∈ C} according to their type and arrival time in the market.
• State Space: The state space is given by S.
• Action Set: The action set is given by A. In particular, the action set of
player (l, τ)t at time t in state s is given by:
A(l,τ)(s) =

0, if z(l,τ) = 0
x(l,τ), if z(l,τ) = 1 and τ = 1
R, otherwise
(2.5)
• Transition Probability: For each state s and action vector u ∈∏(l,τ)A(l,τ)(s),
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the transition probability P(s′|s,u) is consistent with the state dynamics in
(2.3), (2.4) and the agent arrival process in 2.1.
We shall focus onMarkov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) [24, 19] throughout our discus-
sion. This refers to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the stochastic dynamic game
where players’ strategies only depend on the current state. The Markov strategy is
thus defined as a function:
u : S → A
which maps the system state to the instantaneous demand in the action set from
agent (l, τ)t. Moreover, as all agents have the same cost structure, it is natural to
focus on symmetric stationary pure strategy equilibria where for every (l, τ) ∈ C, the
agents {(l, τ)t : t ∈ Z} adopt the same decision rule denoted by u(s). The symmetry
of this problem makes it possible to consider a single agent’s problem to characterize
the equilibrium, which we formalize as follows:
Definition 1 (Markov Perfect Symmetric Equilibrium Strategy) A strategy
profile
unc = {unc(l,τ)(s) : (l, τ) ∈ C, s ∈ S}
is defined to be a Markov Perfect Symmetric Equilibrium Strategy, if the following
fixed point equations are satisfied for all agents (l, τ) ∈ C at any time t, for any
system states s(t) ∈ S:
unc(l,τ)(s(t)) = argmin
u
E
[
p(t)u+
τ−1∑
i=1
p(t+ i)unc(l,τ−i)(s(t + i))
∣∣∣s(t)] (2.6)
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subject to:
l−1∑
i=0
unc(l,l−i)(s(t+ i)) = dl(t), ∀t, l,
p(t) = u+
∑
(l′,τ ′)∈C,(l′,τ ′)6=(l,τ)
unc(l′,τ ′)(s(t)),
p(t+ i) =
∑
(l′,τ ′)∈C
unc(l′,τ ′)(s(t+ i)), ∀i ≥ 1,
where s(t) evolves according to (2.3), (2.4).
2.5. Cooperative Market Architecture
As an efficiency benchmark, we consider the cooperative market architecture, under
which the agents can coordinate their actions to minimize their aggregate expected
cost. Later, we show that under the assumptions of quadratic production cost and
marginal cost pricing, the cooperative market architecture leads to the highest mar-
ket efficiency, defined as the total surplus from all agents and the reliable resource
provider. The cooperative market architecture can model the scenario where the
agents agree a priori upon a common strategy that minimizes their aggregate ex-
pected cost, and respond to the realtime market conditions according to the pre-
specified strategy. Particularly, in future electricity markets, the cooperative scheme
may correspond to the situation where the consumers with flexible loads pass all
the relevant information to a load aggregator who schedules the loads on their be-
half. We are interested in the system performance in the stationary equilibrium,
and define the optimal stationary cooperative strategy under the cooperative market
architecture as follows:
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Definition 2 (Optimal Stationary Cooperative Strategy) A strategy profile
uc = {uc(l,τ))(s) : (l, τ) ∈ C, s ∈ S}
is defined to be an Optimal Stationary Cooperative Strategy if uc(s) =
[
uc(l,τ)(s) :
(l, τ) ∈ C] solves the following fixed point equations for any system states s(t) ∈ S:
uc(s(t)) = arg min
uc=
[
u(l,τ):(l,τ)∈C
] lim
T→∞
1
T − tE
[ ∑
(l,τ)∈C
p(t)u(l,τ) +
T∑
t′=t+1
∑
(l,τ)∈C
p(t + i)uc(l,τ)(s(t
′))
∣∣∣s(t)]
(2.7)
subject to:
l−1∑
i=0
uc(l,l−i)(s(t+ i)) = dl(t), ∀t, l,
p(t) =
∑
(l,τ)∈C
u(l,τ),
p(t+ i) =
∑
(l,τ)∈C
uc(l,τ)(s(t + i)), ∀i ≥ 1,
where s(t) evolves according to (2.3), (2.4).
The above problem is a standard infinite horizon average cost MDP, and the associ-
ated Bellman equation can be solved via standard value iteration or policy iteration
[2].
2.6. Welfare Metrics
Different oligopolistic market architectures induce different agent behaviors, which
lead to different stationary distributions of the aggregate demand process {U(t) : t ∈
Z}. We shall focus on two welfare metrics: efficiency and risk. More specifically,
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we define efficiency to be the expected sum of the resource provider’s surplus Wp and
the agents’ surplus Wa as follows:
W = E[p(t)U(t) − 1
2
U(t)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wp
+E[−p(t)U(t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wa
= −1
2
E[U(t)2] =
1
2
Wa (2.8)
Note that under the assumptions of quadratic production cost and marginal cost
pricing, efficiency is decreasing in E[U(t)2]. In (2.7), the optimal stationary cooper-
ative strategy uc(·) maximizes Wa, thus achieves the highest efficiency in the sense
of (2.8), which we denote by W c = W cp +W
c
a . Let W
nc =W ncp +W
nc
a denote the effi-
ciency achieved by the equilibrium strategy unc(·) under the non-cooperative market
architecture. Note that W nc ≤ W c and W nca ≤ W ca . This efficiency loss W ca −W nca
is commonly known as the “price of anarchy” due to the strategic behavior of non-
cooperative agents when payoff externalities exist.
We define risk to be the tail probability of the stationary process of aggregate
demand:
R = Pr(U(t) > M) (2.9)
for some positive large constant M . As a result of marginal cost pricing and increas-
ing marginal cost, risk also captures the tendency for aggregate demand / prices to
spike drastically (above a large M). We also define market robustness to be:
B = 1−R. (2.10)
Apart from market efficiency, risk, in terms of demand spikes, is also an important
welfare metric. In a given oligopolistic market, rational agents respond to endoge-
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nous realtime prices to minimize individual costs. However, a system designer may
have interests different from the agents, and be concerned about the risk, in particu-
lar the aggregate demand spikes or cost surges. In the sequel, we shall demonstrate,
by analyzing the case with L = 2, that under the non-cooperative market architec-
ture, even though there is a efficiency loss, the strategic behavior also results in a
smaller tail probability, which is associated with a lower endogenous risk. A more
fundamental question that we attempt to address is to what extent exogenous un-
certainties is inevitable and to what extent it can be controlled in the system. More
specifically, is there a limit of the feedback control, in the form of load scheduling, to
achieve the dual goals of increasing market efficiency and reducing endogenous risk?
Later we will show that for a broad class of load scheduling strategies, the exogenous
randomness cannot be completely eliminated, and the dual goals cannot be achieved
simultaneously.
So far, we have formulated the load scheduling problem as a stochastic dynamic
oligopolistic game under the non-cooperative market architecture, and as an infinite
horizon average cost MDP under the cooperative market architecture. In general,
there are no closed form solutions to either of the two formulations, and numerical
solutions involve exponential complexity. In the following chapter, we will look into
the case where the number of types L = 2, and the equilibrium strategy as well as
the optimal cooperative strategy can be found explicitly .
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Chapter 3
Tradeoff Analysis for L = 2 Case
3.1. Equilibrium Strategy and Optimal Coopera-
tive Strategy
When L = 2, there are only two types of agents in the system: type 1 agents with
uncontrollable loads that must be satisfied upon arrival, and type 2 agents who have
the flexibility to split the consumption between two consecutive time periods. Under
the assumption of Bernoulli arrival process, at any time t, there are at most 3 agents
in the market, which are indexed as: (1, 1)t, (2, 1)t, and (2, 2)t. Among the three
agents, only the type 2 agent (2, 2)t that arrives in the current period needs to make
a nontrivial decision, while the other two agents have no choice but to empty their
backlogs and leave the market.
Note that this simple case still retains the two key features of the general model.
Firstly, since the active time window between any two consecutive type 2 agents
partially overlap, when a type 2 agent schedules his consumption, he needs to take
into account the action of the preceding type 2 agent, as well as to anticipate the
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reaction of the succeding type 2 agent, in a similar way of the sequential Stackelberg
competition [16]; secondly, this dynamic system has exogenous uncertainties in terms
of agent arrivals and load realizations. Considering the case of L = 2 sheds light
on understanding agent behaviors induced by oligopolistic market architectures in
the general setup. In electricity market, this case with a few oligopolistic agents can
be used to study the interaction among a few load aggregators, each of which has
considerable market power.
We first simplify the notations. When agent (2, 2)t schedules his consumption
(u(2,2)(t), u(2,1)(t)), the sufficient statistics of system state for him is (x(t), d2(t)),
where x(t) = x(1,1)(t) + x(2,1)(t) is defined as the aggregate backlog state. We also
define a linear strategy as a strategy profile u(s) if u(1,1)(s) = x(1,1), u(2,1)(s) = x(2,1),
and u(2,2)(s) = u(x, d2) which is a linear function of x and d2, i.e.,
u(x, d2) = −ax+ bd2 + g.
Proposition 1 (Existence of linear MPE) For L = 2, under the non-cooperative
market architecture, there exists a Markov perfect symmetric equilibrium with the lin-
ear strategy unc(x, d2) given by:
unc(x, d2) =− 1
2(1 +
√
1− q2
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
anc
x+
1
1 + 1√
1− q2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
bnc
d2 +
q1µ1 + q2µ2
1
1+
√
1− q
2
2(1 +
√
1− q2
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gnc
(3.1)
Proof 1 Please refer to Appendix C.1
The optimal stationary cooperative strategy can also be obtained as a closed form
solution of the Belllman equation with L = 2.
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Proposition 2 (Existence of linear optimal stationary cooperative strategy)
For L = 2, under the cooperative market architecture, there exists a linear optimal
stationary cooperative load scheduling strategy uc(x, d2) given by:
uc(x, d2) =− 1
1 +
√
1− q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ac
x+
1
1 + 1√
1−q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
bc
d2 +
q1µ1 + q2µ2
1
1+
√
1−q2
1 +
√
1− q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
gc
(3.2)
Proof 2 Please refer to Appendix C.2.
3.2. Welfare Impacts
Given a linear strategy u(x, d2) = −ax + bd2 + g, (a ∈ (0, 1)), we have the state
evolution dynamics:
x(t + 1) = o(1,1)(t+ 1)d1(t+ 1) + o(2,2)(t)
(
d2(t)− u(x(t), d2(t))
)
which pins down the stationary distribution X of the aggregate backlog state {x(t) :
t ∈ Z} and U of the aggregate demand process {U(t) : t ∈ Z}, and it also determines
the efficiency and risk performance.
Take expectation on both side of the aggregate backlog state dynamics, and we
obtain the first and second moment of X as follows:
E[x(t)] =
q1µ1 + q2((1− b)µ2 − g)
1− q2a
E[x(t)2] =
1
1− q2a2
[
q1(µ
2
1 + σ
2
1) + q2
(
((1− b)µ2 − g)2 + (1− b)2σ22
)
+ 2q1q2µ1((1− b)µ2 − g)
+ 2
a
1− q2a
(
q2((1− b)µ2 − g) + q1q2µ1
)(
q2((1− b)µ2 − g) + q1µ1
)]
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Assuming that all type 2 agents adopt the same linear strategy u(x, d2) = −ax +
bd2 + g, market efficiency, as defined in (2.8), is given by:
W = −E[U(t)2]/2
= −1
2
(
(1− q2 + q2(1− a)2)E[x(t)2] + 2q2(1− a)(bµ2 + g)E[x(t)] + q2((bµ2 + g)2 + b2σ22)
)
In particular, with the specific linear strategies unc(·, ·) and uc(·, ·), we can calculate
the efficiency W nc and W c under the non-cooperative and the cooperative market
architectures. The difference ∆ = W c −W nc is positive and increasing in q2, as well
as increasing in σ21 and σ
2
2 , the variance of the workload distributions. The higher q2
is, the larger efficiency loss of non-cooperative scheme will be, which suggests that
the cooperative load scheduling scheme becomes increasingly efficient as the arrival
rate of flexible loads increases.
However, the stationary distributions of the aggregate demand processes in Fig-
ure B-6 show that the cooperative scheme also thickens the right tail of the outcome
distribution, which extremely high aggregate demands are quantified as a higher
upper bound of risk in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Upper bound on the risk R) Suppose that the workload distri-
bution Di are Normal distributions N (µi, σ2i ) for i = 1, 2. Given a linear strategy
u(x, d2) = −ax + bd2 + g, (a ∈ (0, 1)), which leads to a stationary aggregate backlog
distribution X , the probability of aggregate backlog exceeding M is upper bounded by:
Pr(x(t) > M) ≤ 1√
2πm1
e−
m21
2
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where
m1 =
M − µ1+(1−b)µ2−g
1−a√
σ21+(1−b)2σ22
1−a2
.
Moreover, if the following condition is satisfied:
1− (1− a)2
1− a2 >
b2
σ21
σ22
+ (1− b)2
(3.3)
the risk of aggregate backlog exceeding M is upper bounded as follows:
R = Pr(U(t) > M) ≤ q Pr(x(t) ≥M) + o(e−M) as M →∞ (3.4)
Proof 3 Please refer to Appendix C.3.
Note that both E[x(t)] and E[x(t)2] are increasing in a, and decreasing in b and
g. It is easy to verify that the stationary distribution of x(t) induced by the linear
optimal cooperative strategy uc(·, ·), has a larger mean and a larger variance than
that induced by the non-cooperative equilibrium strategy unc(·, ·). In other words,
the state of the aggregate backlog is more volatile in the cooperative scheme. Also,
when σ1 = σ2, the cooperative market architecture leads to a higher upper bound
of risk than that under the non-cooperative market architecture. This is consistent
with the following simulation results where the cooperative scheme indeed results
in a higher risk than that in the non-cooperative scheme. The interpretation of the
condition in (3.3) is that, when the variance of flexible load realizations is sufficiently
lower than that of the uncontrollable load realizations, and when the coefficient a
is relatively large than the coefficient b, the aggregate demand spikes are mostly
contributed by the high aggregate backlogs.
Remark 2 (Interpretation of the coefficients) For a linear strategy u(x, d2) =
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−ax + bd2 + g adopted by type 2 agents, the coefficient a can be interpreted as the
sensitivity to the aggregate backlog x(t). A larger a means that the strategy is more
aggresive in absorbing the fluctuation of uncontrollable loads in the environment.
Note that both anc and ac are increasing in q2. Intuitively, with a higher type 2
arrival rate q2, each type 2 agent is more aggresive in responding to x(t) at their
first period, anticipating that during the second period will arrive and respond to
x(t + 1) in a similar aggresive way. Also note that for any arrival rate q2, a
nc < ac
always holds, and ac ∈ [0.5, 1], anc ∈ [0.25, 0.2929], which means that type 2 agents
alway respond less aggresively to the aggregate backlog x(t) under the non-cooperative
market architecuture. This can be understood as a result of their strategic behavior
at equilibrium. Similarly, we can interpret the coefficient b as the sensitivity to the
realizations of d2(t). We also make the observations that b
nc > bc, and both bnc, bc
are decreasing in q2.
3.3. Numerical results
In the following, we shall visualize the efficiency-risk tradeoffs. In particular, we
compare the stationary distribution of the aggregate demand process induced by four
different linear strategies. We have uc(·, ·) from the cooperative scheme, and unc(·, ·)
from the non-cooperative scheme. In addition, we define the “naive load scheduling”
scheme to be unaive(x, d2) = d2/2, in which case every type 2 agent evenly splits his
work load between his two periods, and define the “no load scheduling” scheme to
be uno(x, d2) = d2, in which case every type 2 agent completes his work load at his
first period.
• Figure B-3a shows the efficiency performance, which is negatively proportional
to the second order moment of the aggregate demand process, under the four
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strategies. We observe that as the arrival rate q2 of type 2 agents increases,
E[U(t)2] increases for every strategy. This is mainly due to the increase in
the workload. We also observe the efficiency loss of the non-cooperative load
scheduling scheme when compared to the cooperative scheme for all arrival
rates.
Figure B-3b shows the variance of the aggregate demand process as the arrival
rate q2 increases from 0 to 1. The variance is contributed by the uncertainties
from both the Bernoulli arrival process and the workload realizations, and
effective load scheduling tends to attenuate the variance. Since the uncertainty
from the Bernoulli arrival process achieves its maximum at q2 = 1/2, the
variance versus the rate q2 plots have the hump shape. Also, we observe that the
variance gap between the non-cooperative and the cooperative scheme increases
as q2 increases. This indicates that the cooperative load scheduling becomes
more powerful in terms of attenuating the aggregate demand variance when
the arrival rate of flexible loads increases.
• Figure B-4 compares the risk of spikes across the four strategies. The 0.95-
quantile of the stationary distribution of the aggregate demand process is plot-
ted for each strategy. A higher 0.95-quantile is associated with a higher risk
for some large constant M . The 0.95-quantile increases in q2 mostly due to
the heavier workload arrival. We also observe that as the arrival rate q2 in-
creases, risk increases most rapidly with the cooperative scheme, while the
non-cooperative scheme gives the lowest risk for all q2 and only slightly in-
creases as the arrival rate increases.
• Figure B-5 shows the sample paths of the aggregate demand process under the
non-cooperative and the cooperative market architecture. In Figure B-5a, we
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observe that at a smaller time scale, the cooperative scheme can better smooth
the aggregate demand process, which is consistent with the lower aggregate
demand variance. However in Figure B-5b, at a larger time scale, we can
identify more demand spikes produced endogenously by the cooperative load
scheduling scheme, corresponding to the higher risk of the cooperative scheme.
• Figure B-6 plots the empirical distributions of the aggregate demand process
in both linear scale in Figure B-6a and in log scale in Figure B-6b. We ob-
serve that under the cooperative market architecture, the distribution is more
concentrated around the mean. However, associated with a higher risk, the dis-
tribution also has a heavier tail when compared to that in the non-cooperative
scheme.
Figure B-12 shows the resulting aggregate demand stationary distribution of
the cooperative and the non-cooperative load scheduling scheme under the non-
negative demand constraint. We observes that it qualitatively resembles the
corresponding distribution Figure B-6 in most essential aspects.
Remark 3 (When do spikes occur) A better understanding the local interaction
between agents with flexible loads also helps to discover the origin of endogenous risk,
namely the triggers for demand spikes. On one hand, the instantaneous aggregate
demand will be driven up when the workload realization dl(t) from either type of
agent is extremely high, which corresponds to the rare events of the load arrival
processes. We classify this type of spikes to be exogenous. Moreover, for bounded
support of Dl and large enough constant M , the exogenous shocks do not directly
contribute to the risk measure. On the other hand, an aggregate spike can also be
produced endogenously when there is a sudden absence of type 2 agent arrival after
some consecutive periods during which type 2 agents continued to arrive, upon which
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event the accumulated high aggregate backlog at the deadline translates into a demand
spike.
When obtaining the risk upper bound in Proposition 3, we made use of the fact that
most of the spikes are produced endogenously. This observation is further confirmed
by the conditional distributions of aggregate demand process in Figure B-7. We can
see that the tail of the aggregate demand distribution is much larger conditional on
that there is no type 2 agent arrival, and is much larger conditional on that the
aggregate backlog is high. Intuitively, the more efficient a load scheduling strategy is,
the more intense the backlog usage will be, and the resulting high backlog volatility
leads to demand spikes.
We also point out that the tradeoffs we observed hold not only between the coop-
erative and non-cooperative market architectures above, but also exist in a variety of
oligopolistic market architectures. Even when the agents can coordinate their actions
and are risk sensitive, so that large spikes are mitigated, the tradeoff still exists and
is shaped by different market achitectural properties. In Appendix D.1, we provide
two parameterized variations of the market architectures, where the number of new
arrival of each type can be great than 1, and where the agents can be risk sensitive,
seperately.
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Chapter 4
General L Analysis: Pricing
As illustrated in Figure B-2a, the agents who make their load scheduling decisions
can be viewed as a full state feedback controller, the control signal u(t) is fed back
to the plant and affects the system state evolution according to (2.3) and (2.4),
and the system output is the aggregate demand process {U(t) : t ∈ Z}. In the
case with L = 2, even when the existing agents adopt a linear strategy, the system
dynamics is not linear since the type 2 agents (2, 2)t do not arrive at every period t.
For a general L, the load scheduling strategy, which is determined under a specific
market architecture, does not form a linear time-invariant feedback controller. The
non-linearity as a result of the Bernoulli arrival processes complicates the analysis,
and there is no explicit solution to the equilibrium load scheduling strategy under
marginal cost pricing in both the cooperative and the non-cooperative schemes.
We realize that the main hurdle of analyzing the general L case lies in the non-
linear dynamics due to the intermittent agent arrivals. To circumvent the problem
we shall introduce a modified system with surrogate performance measures, which
resembles the original system in the most essential ways and facilitates the analy-
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sis. The results obtained in this LTI framework provide us some insights on the
original non-linear system dynamics and the efficiency-risk tradeoffs. The two key
modifications are listed and interpreted as follows:
Modification 1 The agent arrival rate q = 1, namely agents of all types arrive at
every period, so that h(t) = 1 and o(t) = 1 for all t.
Modification 2 The second moment E[z2(t)
2] of the aggregate backlog process z2(t) =
e′x(t) is used as a substitute measure for risk.
Observations of the correlation between spikes and backlog, as well as the correlation
between spikes and the absence of flexible loads in Remark 3 motivate us to use
the backlog volatility as a substitute measure for the risk. Notice that there is no
contradiction between the first two modifications. We examine the case with q = 1,
and the equilibrium strategy, as well as the evolution of the backlog state in the
regime of high arrival rate q will be similar to the case of q = 1; however, absence
of flexible loads still happens exogenously with small probabilities, and upon which
occurrences a high backlog is turned into a demand spike. Therefore, the volatility
of the aggregate backlog state is used as a substitute measure for the risk of spikes.
We also normalize the load arrival process so that the average load realization
µ, the average backlog state E[x(t)], and the average demand E[u(t)], are all zero
vectors. We also assume the load arrival process {d(t) : t ∈ Z} is an i.i.d. process. In
summary, the system diagram of the modified system with linear dynamics is shown
in Figure B-2b. The performance measures are the variance of the two outputs: z1(t)
z2(t)
 =
 e′u(t)
e′x(t)
 .
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From the system operator’s view, we are interested in how agent decision making
is shaped by the market architecture, and how the architecture should be designed so
that the desired agent behavior is induced. Usually many of the market architectural
properties, for example the degree of cooperation and risk sensitivity of the agents,
are given, and the system operator’s only freedom is to design the pricing rule. In
the following, we shall consider a non-cooperative setup within the LTI framework,
and examine the equilibrium load scheduling strategies under any linear pricing rule,
which will be decided by the system operator1. In particular, we focus on the static
linear pricing rules parameterized by coefficients q1 and q2, in the form:
p(t) = q′1x(t) + q
′
2u(t). (4.1)
The instantaneous demand decisions are made by individual agents under the dead-
line constraints in a non-cooperative way. We restrict ourselves to the linear sym-
metric MPE, assuming that the load scheduling strategy, if exists, is in the following
form:
u∗(t) = F∗x(t), (4.2)
and we denote the (l, τ)-th row of F∗ by F∗(l,τ) ∈ RDc . By individual rationality,
u(l,τ)(t) is optimized by agent (l, τ)t when he dynamically updates his load scheduling
decision, forming the rational expectation that all other agents are adopting the
equilibrium linear strategy as in (4.2). More specifically, apply the one-shot deviation
principle at the equilibrium and we have the optimal load scheduling decision u∗(l,τ)(t)
1 In Appendix D.3, we study another example where the system operator regulates the archi-
tectural property of “degree of cooperation” by imposing a “congestion fee”, which in effect works
to internalize the payoff externalities.
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given by:
∀(l, τ) ∈ C, if τ > 1, u∗(l,τ)(t) = argmin
u∈R
{
p(t)u+ E[
τ−1∑
k=1
p(t+ k)F∗(l,τ−k)x(t+ k)]
}
(4.3)
subject to: u(t) = F∗x(t) + e(l,τ)(u− F∗(l,τ)x(t))
u(t + k) = F∗x(t + k), ∀k > 0
p(i) = q′1x(i) + q
′
2u(i), ∀i
x(i+ 1) = R1x(i) +R2d(i)−R1u(i), ∀i
if τ = 1, u∗(l,τ)(t) = e(l,τ)x(t),
where e(l,τ) is a Dc dimensional vector with the only non-zero element being 1 at the
(l, τ)-th position. Moreover, at the symmetric equilibrium the rational expectation
should be consistent with the best response strategy, namely (4.2) should be satisfied.
A direct application of the principle of optimality to (4.3) leads to
F∗ = f(q1,q2)(F
∗). (4.4)
For given coefficients q1,q2, the (l, τ)-th row of the mapping f(q1,q2) : R
Dc×Dc →
R
Dc×Dc is specified as follows:
f(q1,q2)(F)(l,τ) =

e′(l,τ) if τ = 1,
e′
(l,τ)
R′1A(l,τ)
(
R1(I−F)+R1e(l,τ)F(l,τ)
)
−
(
q′1+q
′
2(F−e(l,τ)F(l,τ))
)
e′
(l,τ)
R′1A(l,τ)R1e(l,τ)+2e
′
(l,τ)
q2
if τ > 1,
(4.5)
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where
A(l,τ) =
τ−1∑
k=1
((
R1(I−F)
)k−1)′(
(q1+F
′q2)F(l,τ−k)+F′(l,τ−k)(q
′
1+q
′
2F)
)((
R1(I−F)
)k−1)
.
The highly nonlinear mapping f(q1,q2) is not a contraction, and obtaining the condi-
tions on the parameters which guarantee the existence of a fixed point solution to
(4.5) is a challenging task. However, the equation still provides a set of necessary
conditions for the equilibrium strategies to satisfy. An iteration algorithm with a
carefully chosen initial guess will converge to such a fixed point, and we will use nu-
merical examples to show how the pricing parameter q1 and q2 shift the equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (System operator’s problem) Assume the system operator’s util-
ity function is increasing in efficiency and decreasing in risk, and in particular is
linearly decreasing in both the volatility of aggregate demand and aggregate backlog
as follows:
J(E[z1(t)
2],E[z2(t)
2]) = −(α1E[z1(t)2] + α2E[z2(t)2]).
The system operator optimizes the parameterized pricing rule as defined in (4.1) to
maximizes its utility, and the optimal solution (q∗1,q
∗
2) is given by solving the following
problem:
min
q1,q2∈RDc , Q,F∈RDc×Dc
α1e
′F(q1,q2)QF(q1,q2)e+ α2e
′Qe (4.6)
subject to: R1(I− F)Q(I− F′)R′1 −Q +R2R′2 = 0 (4.7)
F = f(q1,q2)(F) (4.8)
where f(q1,q2) is the mapping defined in (4.5).
Proof 4 Please refer to Appendix C.4.
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Chapter 5
General L Analysis: fundamental
tradeoff
In Chapter 4, we have introduced the modified system, as well as evaluated the MPE
strategy and system performance in a non-cooperative setup under linear pricing
rules. The following interesting questions naturally arise: are the equilibrium load
scheduling strategies in the non-cooperative setup optimal? If not, given the system
dynamics what are the optimal strategies? Does there exist a market architecture
that induces such optimal strategies? This chapter is devoted to an examination of
these questions.
Ideally, the desirable load scheduling should simultaneously maximize efficiency
and minimize risk, or equivalently in the modified setup, simultaneously suppress
the volatility of the two measured processes: z1(t) and z2(t). A load scheduling
strategy is defined to be Pareto optimal if there does not exist any other strategy
that makes the volatility of z1(t) smaller without making the volatility of z2(t) larger,
and a pair (E[z1(t)
2],E[z2(t)
2]) locates on the Pareto front if it is achieved by a
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Pareto optimal strategy. Unless the Pareto front trivially includes the point (0, 0),
it dictates the limit of the system performances with a downward sloping tradeoff
curve between efficiency and risk. Also note that the concept of Pareto optimal
load scheduling strategy does not rely on market architecture specifications, in the
sense that the system performance achievable under any specific market architecture
will be bounded by the Pareto front. The Pareto front thus serves as a benchmark
to measure how far away a load scheduling strategy induced by a specific market
architecture is from the optimal strategies.
In order to neatly characterize the set of Pareto optimal load scheduling strategies,
we hereby introduce the third modification to the LTI system:
Modification 3 The deadline constraints, which require that all agents empty their
backlogged load when they exit the market, are relaxed. Instead, we track the total
load mismatch upon their deadline:
z3(t) = e
′
L(x(t)− u(t)),
where eL is a Dc-dimensional column vector with the first L elements being ones
and all others zero. We define the second moment E[z3(t)
2] as the third performance
measure. Note that the smaller the variance is, on average the more closely that
deadline constraints are met, and when E[z3(t)
2] = 0, the deadline constraints are
enforced.
Finally, after the three modifications, the system diagram with the inputs of load
arrival processes and the outputs z(t) = [z1(t), z2(t), z3(t)] is shown in Figure B-2c.
We generalize the tradeoff between efficiency and risk to a three-way tradeoff among
efficiency, risk, and load mismatch upon deadline, with the three-way Pareto optimal
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strategies and the three-way Pareto front (a surface in the 3-dimensional space)
similarly defined. Now we are able to cast the problem of finding Pareto optimal load
scheduling strategy into a H2 optimization problem with an unconstrained feedback
controller, which admits a convex characterization.
In order to trace out the Pareto front, we follow the standard multi-objective
optimization technique to scalarize the objective. Consider the weighted output
process:
zα(t) = [α1z1(t), α2z2(t), α3z3(t)],
where αi > 0, for i = 1, 2, 3, and α
2
1+α
2
2+α
2
3 = 1. A Pareto optimal load scheduling
strategies minimize the H2 system norm for a given weight α = (α1, α2, α3):
min
{u(t):t∈Z}
‖zα(t)‖22
subject to: x(t+ 1) = R1(x(t)− u(t)) +R2d(t)
Proposition 5 (Three-way Pareto front) 1. For given non-negative weight α =
(α1, α2, α3), the corresponding Pareto optimal load scheduling strategy is static
and linear in the system state x(t) as follows:
u(t) = F∗αx(t).
where F∗α = Q
∗P∗−1, and (Q∗,P∗) is the unique solution to the following convex
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optimization problem:
min
Q,P∈RDc×Dc ,M∈R3×3
ρ
subject to: Q > 0,
Trace(M) ≤ ρ, Q (R1Q−R1P)′
(R1Q−R1P) Q−R2R′2
 > 0,
 Q (C1Q +D12P)′
(C1Q+D12P) M
 > 0.
where
C1 = [0 α2e α3eL]
′, D12 = [α1e 0 − α3eL]′.
2. Given a matrix F such that the feedback rule u(t) = Fx(t) stabilizes the system,
the H2 norm of the three performance measures is given by:
‖z1(t)‖22 = e′FQFF
′
e; ‖z2(t)‖22 = e′QFe; ‖z3(t)‖22 = (e′ − e′LF)QF (e′ − e′LF)′
where QF is the controllability Gramian given by solving the following equation:
R1(I− F)QF (I− F′)R′1 −QF +R2R′2 = 0
Proof 5 Please refer to Appendix C.5.
With different parameters of α = (α1, α2, α3), different Pareto optimal solutions
are produced, and we can trace out the Pareto front. In particular, the curve when re-
stricting the three-way Parato front to the plane of ‖z3(t)‖22 = ǫ for ǫ≪ 1 approaches
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the efficiency-risk tradeoff curve when the deadline constraints are enforced, and the
corresponding weight α satisfies α3/α1 ≫ 1 and α3/α2 ≫ 1.
As an example, in Figure B-8, we plot the Pareto front for the case with L = 5
to visualize the three-way tradeoff among the three system performance measures.
In Figure B-9, we observe that as we tighten the constraint on load mismatch upon
deadline, namely with a smaller β3 in the constraint ‖z3(t)‖22 ≤ β3, the two-way
Pareto front of efficiency and risk shifts outward, which means that volatility of both
aggregate demand and aggregate backlog will increase. Similarly, as the constraint
on the second performance measure becomes tighter, namely with a smaller β2 in the
constraint ‖z2(t)‖22 ≤ β2, the Pareto front of the other two measures shifts outward.
The second part of Proposition 5 provides a way to evaluate the system per-
formance for any linear load scheduling strategies. In Appendix D.2, we introduce
some parameterized classes of heuristic load scheduling strategies, the parameters of
which reflect the market architectural properties. Numerical results reveal how the
tradeoffs among the three goals are shaped, as well as how far they are away from
the benchmark of the Pareto front characterized above.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a framework to examine the welfare impacts of load
scheduling under different market architectures. We took the approach of modeling
agent behavior with dynamic oligopolistic games, and pointed out that different mar-
ket architectures induce different agent behaviors, which lead to a tradeoff between
efficiency and risk at the aggregate level. Moreover, we provided a characterization of
the efficiency-risk Pareto front. This is the fundamental tradeoff limit for the system
with load scheduling dynamics, in the sense that the system performance induced by
any market architecture is bounded by the front.
There are two directions of our future research. First, we would like to relax
the complete information assumption, and examine the model with a large number
of coexisting agents. This is the case in many real life applications including fu-
ture electricity market, where small entities that own generation powers are able to
participate, and system state is not globally available. Mean field game theory is a
promising tool in analyzing agent behavior in this dynamic stochastic game with a
large number of players. The interesting questions we want to address are: how do
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agents react to local and systemic dynamics, and how is agent behavior shaped by the
information structure? Moreover, when in the limit the market becomes competitive,
does similar efficiency-risk tradeoff exist?
Secondly, we would like to look into the system operator’s problem of optimizing
the pricing rule. In our current work, the system performance is determined by the
aggregation of autonomous agents’s behavior, which relies on the pricing mechanism
in an intricate way, and there is no tractable way for the system operator to design
the pricing rule to induce the desired agent behavior. We are still exploring different
formulations which can give us some insights on the problem of pricing mechanism
design. More generally, realtime prices can be viewed as an endogenously generated
payoff relevant signal sent by the system operator to the agents, aiming to induce
the rational agents to respond to the signal in a desirable way. Another interesting
question to ask is: what are the signaling schemes in general that can incentivize the
agents to behave in certain ways?
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Appendix A
Tables
l ∈ L agent type
(l, τ)t ∈ C at time t, the type l agent who will continue to stay in the market for τ periods
d(t) ∈ RL new agent load realization at time t
h(t) ∈ {0, 1}L new agent arrival event at time t
x(t) ∈ RDc backlog state
o(t) ∈ {0, 1}Dc existence state
s(t) ∈ S system state, s(t) = (x(t), z(t))
u(t) ∈ RDc instantaneous demand
p(t) realtime price per unit resource
U(t) instantaneous aggregate demand
unc symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) load scheudling strategy
uc optimal stationary cooperative load scheduling strategy
W efficiency
R risk
B robustness
Table A.1: Notations
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Appendix B
Figures
Figure B-1: Visualization of agent index (l, τ)t. For L = 5, τ = 3, at time t there
are at most 3 agents that will stay in the market for 3 periods. If they indeed arrive
at the market, namely h3(t) = h4(t− 1) = h5(t− 2) = 1, at time t they are indexed
as (5, 3)t, (4, 3)t and (3, 3)t, seperately.
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(a) Orginal system dynamics with non-linear
feedback controller.
(b) Linear time-invariant system formulation.
There are two measurements: aggregate out-
put process z1(t), and aggregate backlog pro-
cess z2(t). At equilibrium, load scheduling
strategies of individual agents form a linear
state feedback controller.
(c) Linear time-invariant system formulation
with relaxed deadline constraint. There are
three measurements: aggregate output pro-
cess z1(t), aggregate backlog process z2(t),
and aggregate load mismatch upon deadline
z3(t). u(t) = F
∗
αx(t) is a Pareto optimal load
scheduling strategy profile.
Figure B-2: System diagrams
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Figure B-3: Market efficiency under different load scheduling schemes. System pa-
rameters as follows: the number of agent types L = 2; uncontrollable load Bernoulli
arrival rate q1 = 1; mean and variance of arrival load distribution µ1 = µ2 = 10,
σ1 = σ2 = 11. The cooperative load scheduling scheme leads to a lower aggregate
consumption variance and thus a higher efficiency than that of the non-cooperative
load scheduling scheme. This is known as the “price of anarchy” of strategic behavior
in non-cooperative game.
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Figure B-4: Risk under different load scheduling schemes. For any arrival rate q,
the stationary distribution of the aggregate demand process has a larger tail under
the cooperative market architecture than that under the non-cooperative market
architecture. System parameters as follows: the number of agent types L = 2;
Bernoulli arrival rate q1 = q2 = q; mean and variance of arrival load distribution
µ1 = µ2 = 15, σ1 = σ2 = 4.
62
50 60 70 80 90 100
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
time
a
gg
re
ga
te
 d
em
an
d
 
 
cooperative
non−cooperative
(a) Short time scale
500 600 700 800 900 1000
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
time
a
gg
re
ga
te
 d
em
an
d
 
 
cooperative
non−cooperative
(b) Large time scale
Figure B-5: Sample paths of the aggregate demand process under the cooperative and
the noncooperative load scheduling schemes. At a smaller time scale, the cooperative
load scheduling can better smooth out the aggregate demand process. However, at
a larger time scale, there are more demand spikes produced endogenously by the
cooperative load scheduling scheme. This is consistent with the observation of “low
variance, high tail probability” of aggregate demand stationary distribution under
the cooperative market architecture. System parameters as follows: the number of
agent types L = 2; Bernoulli arrival rate q1 = q2 = 0.9; mean and variance of arrival
load distribution µ1 = µ2 = 15, σ1 = σ2 = 6.
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Figure B-6: Empirical distribution of the stationary aggregate demand process under
the cooperative and the noncooperative load scheduling schemes. The stationary dis-
tribution under the non-cooperative market architecture is more spread out but also
has a smaller tail probability, while the distribution under the cooperative market
architecture is more concentrated around the mean but also has a larger tail probabil-
ity. System parameters as follows: the number of agent types L = 2; Bernoulli arrival
rate q1 = q2 = 0.6; mean and variance of arrival load distribution µ1 = µ2 = 15,
σ1 = σ2 = 6.
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Figure B-7: Observations of when spikes happen. The extremely high aggregate
demand (demand spikes) happen mostly when the flexible loads are absent and when
the aggregate backlog state is high. Here we have L = 2, D ∼ N (0, I).
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Figure B-8: The three-way Pareto front. The three objectives are ‖z1‖22, ‖z2‖22, and
‖z3‖22, which are the variance of the aggregate demand, the aggregate backlog, and
the aggregate load mismatch upon deadline, correspondingly. Parameters: L = 5.
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(b) When the constraint on ‖z2‖22 ≤ β2 is tightened, namely β2
decreases, the Pareto front of ‖z1‖22 and ‖z3‖22 shifts outward.
Figure B-9: Visualization of the three-way tradeoff Pareto front. The constraint on
one performance measure affects the location of the tradeoff curve of the other two
measures. Parameters: L = 5.
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(a) Market power leads to efficiency-risk tradeoff.
As the number of agents K increases, individual’s
market power decreases, efficiency increases at the
cost of robustness.
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(b) Risk sensitivity leads to efficiency-risk trade-
off. In the cooperative setup, as the maganitude
of risk sensitivity |θ| increases, agent become more
risk averse, and risk of spikes decreases. We ob-
serve a increase of robustness at the cost of a lower
efficiency.
Figure B-10: Efficieny-risk tradeoffs as a result of different market architectural
properties, in the case with L = 2.
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Figure B-11: Degree of cooperation leads to efficiency-risk tradeoff. As the system
operator increases the “congestion fee” by increasing α, the payoff externality is
reduced, and the degree of cooperation increases, leading to a higher efficiency and
lower level of robustness.
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Figure B-12: Empirical distribution of the stationary aggregate demand process
under the constraint that the instantaneous demand from any agent is restricted to
be non-negative. System parameters as follows: the number of agent types L = 2;
Bernoulli arrival rate q1 = q2 = 0.6; mean and variance of arrival load distribution
µ1 = µ2 = 15, σ1 = σ2 = 6. Under the bounded constraint. Observations similar to
that for Figure B-6 can be made.
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Appendix C
Proofs
C.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The result can be shown by first assuming that all other type 2 agents adopt the
conjectured linear strategy, then verifying the first order conditions, and matching
terms to obtain the coefficients anc, bnc, and gnc. There is a unique root that leads
to a dynamically stable equilibrium. sequence to converge. expectation method and
following the same argument as in
C.2. Proof of Proposition 2
We postulate the value function to be of quadratic form V c(x) = Acx2 + Bcx , and
plug it in the R.H.S. of the Bellman equation. Solve the minimization problem to
get the optimal strategy:
uc(x, d2) =− 1
1 + Ac
x+
Ac
1 + Ac
d2 +
Ac
1 + Ac
µ1 +
Bc
2(1 + Ac)
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Substituting back in the R.H.S., and matching terms on both sides yield the coeffi-
cients Ac, Bc, and the optimal per period cost λc:
λc =Acσ21 +
Ac
1 + Ac
qσ22 + µ
2
1 +
1 + Ac − (Ac)2
1 + Ac
qµ21 + 2qµ1µ2
where
Ac =
√
1− q, Bc = 2(1−
√
1− q)(µ2 + µ1).
Therefore, (λc, V c(x) = Acx2 +Bcx) forms a solution to the Bellman equation, with
the linear optimal stationary strategy uc(x, d2) in (3.2).
C.3. Proof of Proposition 3
The stationary distribution of U(t) is of mixed type due to the discrete Poisson
arrival and continuous distribution of load realizations. Since the arrival process
{h2(t) : t ∈ Z} of type 2 agents is exogenous, we first focus on the distribution of of
the aggregate backlog process {x(t) : t ∈ Z}. When |a| < 1, a stationary distribution
X exists and is characterized as follows:
X = Xk with probability qk(1− q), (k = 0, 1, · · · )
Xk =
k∑
i=1
ai−1
(
D1,i + (1− b)D2,i
)
+ akD1,k − 1− a
k
1− a g
where {D1,i : i ∈ Z+} and {D2,i : i ∈ Z+} are i.i.d. random sequences respectively.
For every k, the mean and variance of the random variable Xk are given by:
E[Xk] = (1− a
k+1)µ1 + (1− ak)((1− b)µ2 − g)
1− a , Var[Xk] =
(1− a2(k+1))σ21 + (1− a2k)(1− b)2σ22
1− a2 .
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Under the assumption that D1,i, D2,i ∼ N (µi, σ2i ), i ∈ {1, 2} the load distribu-
tions are normal, {Xk : k ∈ Z+} are correlated normal random variables. Note that
the mean and variance of Xk are both increasing in k, we can upper bound the tail
probability of X by the limiting distribution limk→∞Xk as follows:
Pr(X ≥M) ≤ Pr( lim
k→∞
Xk ≥M)
Since E[E limk→∞Xk] = limk→∞E[Xk] and limk→∞Var[Xk], and it has normal distri-
bution,
Pr(X ≥ M) = 1− Φ
(
M − µ1+(1−b)µ2−e
1−a
σ21+(1−b)2σ22
1−a2
)
C.4. Proof of Proposition 4
The plant G is given by
G(s) =

A B1 B2
C1 0 D12
I 0 0

where
A = R1, B1 = R2, B2 = −R1,
C1 = [0 α2e α3eL]
′, D12 = [α1e 0 − α3eL]′
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Consider the feedback gain F(s) = DK that stabilizes the system, the closed loop
system is given by
G˜(s) =
 A+B2DK B1
C1 +D12DK 0

(A + B2DK) is Hurwitz and ‖G˜(s)‖ < ρ if and only iff there exists a symmetric
matrix Q such that:
(A+B2DK)Q(A+B2DK)
′ −Q +B1B∗1 < 0 (C.1)
Trace(C1 +D12DK)Q(C1 +D12DK)
′ < ρ (C.2)
Denote P = DKQ, note that (C.1), (C.2) are equivalent to:
(AQ+B2P)Q
−1(AQ+B2P)′ −Q+B1B∗1 < 0
Trace(C1Q+D12P)Q
−1(C1Q+D12P)′ < ρ
Also, since trace is monotonic under matrix inequalities, we can finda matrixM such
that M < ρ and
(C1Q+D12P)Q
−1(C1Q+D12P)′ <M
Apply Schur’s complement operation, we have that (C.1), (C.2) are equivalent to the
LMIs: Q (AQ+B2P)′
AQ+B2P Q−B1B′1
 > 0,
 Q (C1Q+D12P)′
C1Q+D12P M
 > 0.
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The Pareto optimal strategies can therefore be characterized by the convex optimiza-
tion problem to minimize ρ with feedback gain F = Dk = QP
−1.
C.5. Proof of Proposition 5
In the non-cooperative setup, the system operator’s optimization variables are the
pricing parameters q1 and q2. We have shown that for given (q1,q2) pair, at equi-
librium agents’ load scheduling strategy is the fixed point solution to (4.8). Under
the assumption that load arrival process is a i.i.d. sequence, maximizing the system
operator’s utility is equivalent to minimizing the H2 norm of the closed loop sys-
tem, which is given by the objective in (4.6), where Q is the controllability Gramian
specified by the Lyapunov equation in (4.7).
75
76
Appendix D
Supplementary Materials
D.1. Market Architecture Variations for L = 2
The tradeoffs we observed between coopeartive and non-cooperative schemes also
exist in a variety of oligopolistic market architectures. As an example, in this sec-
tion, we provide two parameterized variations of the market architectures, where
the parameter K allows us to tune agents’ market power; and parameter θ captures
the risk sensitivity of the agents. In these two variations, strategies derived are still
of linear forms, with the coefficients as functions of K, and θ, respectively. In the
following study of the case with L = 2, our focus is the two period dynamics of the
representative type 2 agent. For notational convenience, we use m and m+ to denote
m(t) and m(t+ 1) for variables m = x, u, d1, d2, p.
D.1.1 Number of Agents
In the first variation, we adjust agents’ market power by scaling the number of type
2 agents in the market. We assume that when h2(t) = 1, K homogeneous type
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2 agents, all denoted by (2, 2)t, simultaneously arrive at the market, each of them
activates a job with load requirement d2(t)/K and schedules his consumption over
the two periods: (νKd2(t)/K, (1−νK)d2(t)/K). Note that when K = 1, it coincides
with the case of non-cooperative market architecture. At equilibrium, each type 2
agent solves the problem:
νK,∗ = argmin
νK
{
p
d2
K
νK + E{h+2 ,d+2 ,d+1 }
[
p+
d2
K
(1− νK)
]}
(D.1)
where x is the aggregate backlog state, and price is given by
p = x+
d2
K
(
(K − 1)νK,∗ + νK),
p+ = x+ + d+2 ν
K,∗.
Restricting to linear symmetric equilibra, we obtain an equilibrium strategy as fol-
lows:
uK(x, d2) = ν
K,∗d2 = − K
K + 1
1
(1 +
√
1− K
K+1
q2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aK
x+
1
1 + 1√
1− K
K+1
q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
bK
d2
+
K
K+1
1 +
√
1− K
K+1
q2
q1µ1 + q2µ2 1
1 +
√
1− K
K+1
q2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
gK
(D.2)
Remark 4 (Limit when K →∞) Even though the agents with flexible loads are
price anticipating and behave strategically, as the number of coexisting agents K
increases, their market power becomes diluted. When K increases to infinity, the
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equilibrium strategy converges to uc(x, d2), the aggregate demand process converges
to that of the cooperative scheme. The aggregate cost of all the type 2 agents is min-
imized, as well as the overall efficiency is maximized in the limit when K → ∞.
At a first glance, this convergence result contradicts to the Cournot limit theorem,
which states that in a static partial equilibrium setting of quantity competition, profit
maximizing firms become price-takers and the total profits decrease to zero when the
number of firms increases to infinity [12]. However, our setup of the dynamic game
is different from the Cournot competition in critical ways. Under the marginal cost
pricing and deadline constraints, the decisions u(t) from groups of type 2 agents at
consecutive periods are strategic complements, while within each group of K identical
type 2 agents, their decisions on first period consumption are strategic substitutes.
Increasing K leads to higher degree of within group competition which can potentially
increase the group’s cost in the sense of the Cournot limit theorem; however increas-
ing K also decreases each individual’s market power and mitigates the cross group
competition, which effect is dominant and overall results in a higher efficiency.
In Figure B-10a we observe that as the market power decreases, market efficiency
increases while robustness decreases. In particular, when the agents become price
taking asK →∞, the first welfare theorem holds and market efficiency is maximized,
however the market is at the same time the least robust in terms of demand spikes.
D.1.2 Risk Sensitivity
In the second variation, we consider the case where the agents are risk sensitive, and
examine the risk sensitive optimal load scheduling in a cooperative setup. In general,
risk averse agents tend to reduce the aggregate demand spikes, at the cost of a larger
variance of aggregate demand process.
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We follow the Linear-Exponential-Quadratic-Gaussian (LEQG) framework in [26,
14] to study the risk sensitive optimal control. Without loss of generality we assume
q1 = 1 and denote q = q2. Under the assumption that the price is proportional to
the instantaneous aggregate demand, the risk sensitive objective function is defined
recursively as follows:
ct(x, d2) =qEd2
[
(x+ u)2 − 2β
θ
logEd+1 [e
− θ
2
ct+1(d2−u+d+1 ,d+2 ))]
]
+ (1− q)
[
x2 − 2β
θ
logEd+1 [e
− θ
2
ct+1(d+1 ,d
+
2 ))]
]
(D.3)
We also assume the workload distributions Gaussian, namely Di ∼ N (µi, σ2i ) for
i = 1, 2. The risk sensitivity is captured by the parameter θ. When θ < 0, the
agents are risk averse, and when θ > 0, the agents are risk loving. Note that when
θ < 0, the risk averse objective funciton in (D.3) imposes a larger disutility to large
deviations from the mean of ct+1(x
+, d+2 ), leading to higher penalties on the spikes
than in the risk neutral formulation. β is the discount factor. As shown in [14], for
θ < 0, there is a β¯(θ) (0 < β¯ < 1), such that for β ≤ β¯(θ), a linear time invariant
optimal control policy exists. In our formulation, β is chosen to be a small enough
constant to ensure the existence of a solution for the range of θ we consider. Also
note that when θ → 0, β¯(θ) → 1, the problem converges to the risk neutral case,
and the risk sensitive optimal cooperative strategy converges to that in (3.2). The
risk sensitive optimal coopearative strategy minimizes the risk sensitive objective
function as follows:
uc,θ(x(t), d2(t)) = argmin
u
ct(x(t), d2(t))
Proposition 6 For risk sensitivity θ ∈ R, there exists a lower bound β(θ) and an
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upper bound β¯(θ), such that for β(θ) ≤ β ≤ β¯(θ), there exists a risk sensitive optimal
cooperative load scheduling strategy of linear form as follows:
uc,θ(x, d2) = − 1
1 + r3︸ ︷︷ ︸
ac,θ
x+
r3
1 + r3︸ ︷︷ ︸
bc,θ
d2 +
r3(µ1 +
r1
2r2
)
1 + r3︸ ︷︷ ︸
gc,θ
(D.4)
where the coefficients ri for i = 1, 2, 3, are given by:
r3 =
βr2
1 + θσ21r2
r2 =
(1− β − (1− q)θσ21)
(√
1 +
4(1−q)(β+θσ21 )
(1−β−(1−q)θσ21)2
− 1
)
2(β + θσ21)
r1 =
2βr2(1− r2)(µ1 + µ2)
1 + θσ21r2 − β(1− r2)
Note that under the cooperative market architecture, when the agents have a risk
sensitive objective function as above, the load scheduling strategy derived in (D.4)
for θ 6= 0 is different from the risk neutral optimal strategy in (3.2). Nevertheless,
system performance measures of efficiency and robustness remain unchanged. In
Figure B-10b, we observe that when θ ≤ 0 and as the magnitude of θ increases, the
agents become more risk averse, and the market efficiency decreases while the ro-
bustness increases, and market efficiency achieves the maximum at θ = 0. Moreover,
we notice that as the agents become risk loving for θ > 0, their objective deviates
from the market efficiency. Load scheduling produces more spikes at the aggregate
level, which have large negative impacts that bring down the overall efficiency as well
as increase endogenous risks.
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D.2. Numerical Study of Classes of Linear Load
Scheduling Strategies
Through out this section, we restrict ourselves to linear load scheduling strategies:
u(x(t)) = Fx(t),
where F is a Dc ×Dc dimensional matrix.
For general L, the Pareto front cannot be neatly characterized when there are
constraints on the feedback controller specified by u(t) = Fx(t). Next, we shall
numerically examine how the market architectural properties, as reflected by different
constraints on F, affect the location of the corresponding Pareto front.
Intuitively, load scheduling should be operated according to the following princi-
ples: firstly, with all other things being equal, an individual demands more resource
when his backlog is higher; secondly, when other agents’ backlog states are high, he
forms the rational expectation that the instantaneous cost will be driven up, thus
he consumes less to avoid the high instantaneous price. These are consistent with
all the linear strategies we have examined for the case L = 2, which are of the form
u(x, d2) = −ax + bd2 + g where a > 0, b > 0. Based on the above intuition, we
consider the following constraint sets:
• FDL , {F ∈ RDc×Dc : F(l,1) = e(l,1), ∀l ∈ L}, where F(l,1) is the row vector
corresponding to the strategy of agent (l, 1) ∈ C, who meets his deadline, and
e(l,1) is a Dc dimensional row vector with the (l, 1)-th element being one and
all others being zero. This is the constraint set in which deadline constraints
are enforced.
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•Fα ,
F ∈ R
Dc×Dc :
F(l,τ),(l,τ) = 1, ∀(l, τ) ∈ C,
F(l,τ),(l′,τ ′) < 0, ∀(l′, τ ′) 6= (l, τ) ∈ C,∑
(l′,τ ′)6=(l,τ) F(l,τ),(l′,τ ′) = α.

for some α ≤ 1. In this constraint set, an agent’s instantaneous demand is
negatively proportional to other agent’s backlog state, with the sum being α,
and his demand is positively proportional to his own backlog with weight 1.
When α is small, the agent responds less aggresively to other agents, similar to
the non-cooperative load scheduling that we observed in the case with L = 2;
when α is high, the strategy is similar to the cooperative scheme.
•
FBR,δ =
F ∈ R
Dc×Dc :
F(l,1) = e(l,1), ∀l ∈ L
F(l,τ),(l′,τ ′) =
 1− δ, if (l′, τ ′) = (l, τ)− δ
Dc−1 , if (l
′, τ ′) 6= (l, τ)
∀1 < τ ≤ L, l ∈ L

for some δ ∈ [0, 0.5]1. This is a parameterized class of boundedly rational
load scheduling strategies When the parameter δ is large, individual’s load
scheduling decision is more sensitive to the other agents’ backlog states and
less sensitive to his own backlog state. This approximates the scenario when
the market architecture facillitates cooperation among agents.
The following corollary shows the impact of δ on aggregate demand volatility and
aggregate backlog volatility:
1 The upperbound on δ is to ensure system stability for each L ∈ L.
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Proposition 7 (Tradeoff of boundedly rational strategy) Assume that all agents
adopt a boundedly rational load scheduling strategy u(t) = Fx(t), where F ∈ FBR,δ.
The aggregate demand volatility, measured by ‖z1(t)‖22 is decreasing in δ, and the
backlog volatility, measured by ‖z2(t)‖22 is increasing in δ.
Figure B-9 shows how the total weight that an agent’s linear strategy puts on all
other agents’ backlog, i.e. α, affects the Pareto front. We observe that as we decrease
α, the Pareto front shifts from the top left corner to the bottom right corner, namely
from high efficiency - high risk region to low efficiency - low risk region. This can be
viewed as a generalization of our observation in the L = 2 case.
D.3. Congestion Fee and Degree of Cooperation
In this example, the system operator can differentiate agents in the market. By im-
posing a individual specific “congestion fee”, the system operator is able to indirectly
adjust the level of cooperation of the market by changing agents’ utility functions.
Recognizing that a key difference between the non-cooperative and the coopera-
tive market architecture is the payoff externality in the dynamic oligopolistic game,
we introduce a parameterized payoff function to attenuate the externality. More
specifically, for instantaneous price p(t) = U(t), an agent pays for his own demand
at the price p(t), and pays for a portion γ(0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) of the instantaneous demand
from all other agents at the same price p(t). For example, consider a type 2 agent
with controllable load d(t), on top of the total cost p(t)u(t)+p(t+1)(d(t)−u(t)) for
his consumption schedule, he also needs to pay γp(t)x(t), and γp(t+ 1)(d1(t+ 1) +
h2(t+ 1)u(t+ 1)), during period t and (t+ 1)
2. Note that when γ = 0, the induced
2There should be an ex-ante money transfer from type 1 agents to type 2 agents in order to
prevent type 2 agents from mimicing type 1 agents. However we do not explicitly calculate the
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strategy is the same as that under the original non-cooperative market architecture;
and when γ = 1, the equilibrium strategy is close to, though not equivalent to, the
cooperative strategy where there is no payoff externality among the agents.
With the level of payoff externality parameterized by γ, the equilibrium load
scheduling strategy is given by solving the following fixed point equation
uγ(x, d2) = argmin
u
{
p(u+ γx) + E{h+2 ,d+2 ,d+1 }
[
p+(d2 − u+ γ
(
d+1 + h
+
2 u
γ(x+, d+2 ))
)] }
(D.5)
where p(t) = U(t), and x+ = d2 − u+ d+1 . The equilibrium strategy is given by:
uγ(x, d2) = −aγx+ bγd2 + gγ (D.6)
where the coefficients aγ, bγ , and gγ given by the following system of equations:

γq(aγ)3 − (1 + γ)q(aγ)2 + 2aγ − 1+γ
2
= 0
bγ = 1− 2aγ
1+γ
qgγ = [(1−q)(1+γ)−q(2γa
γ−1−γ)(1−aγ )]µ1−q(2γaγ−1−γ)bγµ2
q(2γaγ−1−γ)+ 1+γ
aγ
We evaluate the market efficiency and the upper bound of risk for γ ∈ [0, 1]. In
Figure B-11, we can observe the efficiency-risk tradeoff. As we increase γ from 0
to 1, the level of payoff externality decreases, and market efficiency increases while
robustness decreases, both monotonically.
amount of initial transfer for screening purpose, we shall instead focus on the equilibrium strategy
of type 2 agents, and examine how the aggregate behavior affects the efficiency-risk tradeoffs at the
macro level.
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D.4. Example of state space model of LTI system
for L = 3
As an example, for L = 3 and the two outputs that we measure are:
z1(t) = [1 1 1 1 1 1 ]Fx(t)
z2(t) = [1 1 1 1 1 1 ]x(t)
The constant matrices R1, R2, and F ∈ FBR,δ are given by:
R1 =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0

, R2 =

1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 1

,
F =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
− δ5 − δ5 − δ5 1− δ − δ5 − δ5
− δ5 − δ5 − δ5 − δ5 1− δ − δ5
− δ5 − δ5 − δ5 − δ5 − δ5 1− δ

,
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